exeunt

The course is over, this blog is no longer active.

Summary of the 6th class by Ana

Below is the summary of the last class written by Ana. It’s an unedited draft for now, comments would be helpful. Please come back for the final version.

_____________

 
“Principles of Categorization” – Eleanor Rosch

On the 28th of March we discussed about the work of Eleanor Rosch called “Principles of Categorization”. In this seminar we first discussed how she begins the article with a non-conformist and quite strange example of categorization for the category “animal”
(extracted from an ancient Chinese encyclopaedia). This “type” of categorization proves that all the timed we categorize things, but nevertheless, not all systems of categorization are possible. A categorization means finding similarities and differences and introducing a certain object (or concept  ) in this or that “box”. But what happens if the box doesn’t exist? Can we categorize something in a category that doesn’t exist? Moreover, can we categorize something that doesn’t exist?
In my oppinion there is no such thing as a non-existent category. You create your own category, by the things you are familiar with. But the Chinese categorization was an counter-example. It seemed to me though that a stated category should exist, as it is stated/said/written. But this is another problem/matter that needs further and separate discussion.
Getting back to Rosch’s considerations and our seminar, we agreed that Rosch uses the Chinese categorization to demonstrate the fact that we do not have empty categories (empty “boxes”), as we must have a realistic view of (and over) the world. There are people and objects in the world that need to be organized, thus categorised. And because there is structure in the world, it helps us categorize (by making a correlation between principles and categories). In order for this correlation to happen, we need:
• the existence of the respective correlation;
• a knower;
• cultural categories.
The relationship between purposes defined by natural contextis based on the functional needs (with specific attributes).
Next, we stated the fact that the principles of categorization are based on the function of category systems and the structure of information. In such way, we therefore have the cognitive economy (with a minimum of effort and a maximum of information) and the perceived world (in which we categorize objects according to our perception – we admit the fact that there is a structure in the world).

The category system has 2 dimensions:
• a vertical dimension (associated to inclusion and hierarchies – one class includes another one based on a certain level of inclusiveness),
• a horizontal one (based on segmentation).
An example for this separation would be the scheme below:

But where do we stop? What level is basic? All this must be based on the perceived attributes (what we perceive in the world). But this is the same problem that we had with “features” (a problem of onthology – the onthology of prototypes). It is very important that we are culturally conditioned to see something. We first have the cathegory, then we have the list of features.
  Here we encountered the problem of typicality. Catgories must respect the maximality disctinction: the problem of cue validity (cues as features). The best cues are thise that work all the time (they have a maximum validity) – such as the concept “guils” has for the concept “fish”. Accordingly, “guils” has a cue validity of 1 for “fish” and a null cue validity for other objects/concepts.
 The same thing happens to the concept “animal”. The most typical concept (if we can put it this way) for “animal”, choosing between “dog” and “fish”, is of course “dog”. Why is that though? Do we use it more often? Do we hear it more often? Does a dog look more like an animal than a fish? Or do we associate a dog more with an animal than a fish?

Thus we reached the point of discussing basic level objects, which best mirror the correlational structure of the environment and is the most inclusive level. They have common attributes to most elements in the category they belong to. The basic level object comes to mind when people are asked what is the most representative object for a certain category. And it also is the first level in the lexicon of a language, a certain “label”. For example, kids first learn “dog” and then “animal”, because it is more intuitive this way.
 What is most interesting is that when people are asked to name the attributes of a category, they list the attributes of the basic level object (eg. Attributes of the category “vehicle”: four wheels, a stirring wheel, a gear box, color, dynamicity and so on, which are all attributes of the basic level object – “car”). This is explained by the fact that we identify these attributes quicker within the respective category.

Regarding the matter of context, basic level objects have a neutral context (such as a laboratory), perfect for experiments. For example, if we say that: “There is a dog on the porch”, we do not need to know the species or the name of the dog. But if we say that “There is a collie on the porch” or “a mammal on the porch” (here we “see” much less) we don’t have a neutral context, but a particular one.
 Here we encountered the problem of wrong categories, thinking of the phrase: “There is a whale on the porch” (  ). The concept “whale” is commonly thought as a fish, even though it is a mammal.
 Then we talked about prototypes and the role of objects. Prototypes are best examples for a category (they state the category membership) and it also is the point where most attributes meet. But of course, a prototype depends on the judgement – on the degree of typicality. But it is very important to state that prototypes do not exist: they are a “label”. They are the internal structure of a category and reflect in the mental representation (according to the last period from a list of 3 in Rosch’s work).
 There exists a conventional category and a non-conventional one (we can add to it; it can be a fictional or an existent category).
 Categories are not always labeled with a single word (there can always exist the category of “others”). Categories can also be exhaustive (but not always; although, why do we have the category of “others” if not for making a category exhaustive?).
 Returning to the basic level, we stated that we need it to go to the superordinate level (just like little children do) in order to understand and to perceive it better.
 In conclusion we said that Rosch made a reconsideration of the classical theory (based on necessary and sufficient conditions and on definitions – which put things and objects on equal footing; but there are more or less typical objects that surround us, such as central and periferal members  ). We also stated that the properties are in the members, but they are asscociated with the knower (that is an independet being – be it human, dog, parrot, monkey and so on). Thus, a certain categorization depends on various factors, that all need to be analyzed and of course, not skipped away.

 

re: Rosch’s “Principles of Categorization”

This is a classic text. Here are some things that might help you deal with it:

- first, the paper itself [you have it also in the reader]

- Prof. Rosch’s website

- in case you’re curious about the Borges quote, this will help

- btw, that list made quite an impression; please read page xvi of this book

the outer limits

At some point during the last class I said, with reference to Frege’s notion of objectivity (i.e. shareability) of sense (Sinn) that it is a given that communication is possible, because there is a level at which inter-subjectivity works – a level at which we are similar enough, or similar in some relevant aspects. The problem is how to conceive of this level? I won’t say more here – since Diana and Alex will write a summary for the last class.

Let me just remind you (well, this holds for those of you who were there) that I also mentioned that this given – the fact that our minds are not (completely) opaque, that there are ‘windows’ between subjects, that meanings (i.e. concepts) can be shared – can be questioned when we go beyond the outskirts of the clinically normal mind. (Think also of an alien mind. What about an animal mind?) Could we understand a person that is deeply schizophrenic?

Here is a quote from Giovanni Stanghellini ‘Schizophrenia and the sixth sense’, p.132 (in Chung, Fulford and Graham edts. Reconceiving Schizophrenia, Oxford University Press 2007):

‘A second layer of displacement concerns the feeling I have that something is lacking while trying to communicate with a schizophrenic person. Phenomenologists think that schizophrenic persons show an enhanced aptitude to the bracketing of common-sense experiences and shared meanings [...] The same happens with the meanings we usually attach to words, so that we often lack a common ground for understanding each other. I may for instance have the impression that we use the same word but we attach different meanings to it. Thus, I have the sensation that he [the schizophrenic] does not share the same horizon of meanings that I take for granted to share with the other persons I usually get in touch with. ’

What do you think? Reflect also on what it might be to ‘attach a meaning to a word’? Is this something you do in your head? Does it depend on social, cultural or linguistic infrastructure (i.e. stuff outside your head)?

One more quote, from the same paper, p. 138:

‘If the taken-for-granted becomes explicit, ipso facto it becomes an object for reflection and doubting. This is the common premise for philosophy and insanity.’

a few thoughts about the second meeting

This is not the summary – I will write that soon enough. I’m not so sure in fact what this is .

Today, I thought, we were not very organized. Things could have been clearer. Sorry for that. I’m waiting for your reactions to estimate the damage done. I will come back to the central issues about definitions in the summary. And let’s see what you have to say about the problems faced by the ‘classical theory’. Don’t be shy.

It is not a problem if we get carried away in discussions. But we shouldn’t overdo it. Anyway, here are some of the things that came up today.

1. The question about colorblind people having color concepts:

> Oliver Sacks wrote a book called ‘The Island of the Colorblind’. Here is a review. I have the book - if any of you is really interested, let me know. The linked review will also tell you some things about Knut Nordby, the colorblind color scientist. And this is the island in question.

> In 1982 Frank Jackson wrote a famous paper called ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’. The paper is famous mostly for the story [i.e. thought experiment] of Mary. What would happen if someone that was never exposed to colors sees something red? Suppose that person knows all the science of color already. Will the person learn something new? Btw, David Lodge uses this scenario in one of his novels – ‘Thinks…’. Can’t tell you much, I haven’t read it. Here is a review.

> My green is your red; we use the same names for colors, but they ‘feel’ different. How could we ever tell? This kind of example is called ‘inverted spectrum’ in philosophy. Read about it here. What about pain?

2. Neural networks [this is not directly relevant for what we're doing at this point, but we might talk about such things in the future]

> Basic stuff on Wikipedia

A nice weekend & many martisoare!