The Prototype Theory of Concepts (1)
Last Friday we discussed a few introductory matters concerning the Prototype Theory of Concepts. This collection of theories called the Prototype Theory (PT) emerged in the ‘70s and was developed to address some of the difficulties in Classical Theory. The most significant problem for the definitional structure of concepts that PT tries to account for is the problem of psychological reality. The main tenets of PT are extrapolated from data gathered from psychological experiments. These data proved to be unaffected when studying concepts as definitions.
Here are the main ideas of PT that we mentioned in class:
- Concepts have a structure that encodes a statistical analysis of the properties their members tend to have. Hence, we can identify central or typical members of a category on the one hand, and less typical or peripheral members on the other hand. Concepts with prototypical structure –> their extensions as being graded: birdier, fruitier.
- The features of a concept are not necessary, as there may be items in the extension of a concept that fail to instantiate a certain property(ies). See the zebra without stripes or the 3-legged albino tiger examples.
- Classical Theory –> concept application must satisfy all of the concept’s features, PT –> must satisfy a sufficient number of features, some of which weigh more than others.
- Family resemblance: formal criteria are neither logical nor psychological necessity; open-ended set of properties; falling under the boundaries of a similarity space.
We didn’t say much about the advantages or the criticisms of PT (we’ll do this during the next meeting), but instead we tried to do an exercise. We chose SCIENCE from a list of four other concepts, and we suggested a list of characteristic features for this concept’s prototype. Furthermore, we discussed some members of the category and tried to grade them for typicality. This task proved to be quite challenging, as you remember, and we had a hard time trying to grade the members we found. Now, let me suggest a rethinking of the exercise as follows:
|
|
SCIENCE | PHYSICS | MATHEMATICS | MUSIC | LAW |
| Works with demonstrated data | Yes | yes | Yes | No | No |
| Is built on theories | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
| Has a rigid structure (is formalized) | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Guides our perception of the world | Yes | Yes | ? | ? | No |
| Is innovative | yes | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Makes predictions about facts and behaviours | Yes | Yes | No | No | No |
March 30, 2008 at 9:38 am
Is Prototype Theory the best theory which explains all concepts that (1) fall under the category of natural kinds (2) are expressed by general terms?
(1) It was quite difficult to talk about science, but I see no difficulty in talking about birds.
(2) Fodor’s criticism to Prototype Theory refers only to singular terms (proper names, definite descriptions – ex: the town east form Tennessee). But can the PT be criticised when it comes to general terms?
March 31, 2008 at 4:13 pm
Perhaps SCIENCE was not the best example – if you wanted it to work neatly. It is however a very interesting one, in the sense that it is actually disputed. You don’t see many debates about what falls under FRUIT [maybe in some areas of botany, I don't know].
But take look at how people debate e.g. the theory of evolution. Is it science or a mere cluster of beliefs? [Of course it IS science, but truth and politics rarely intersect - therefore the debate.]
Diana:
1. Short answer – it doesn’t seem so. But it all really depends on the desiderata – what we want or need from our theory of concepts. PT was motivated by some psychological data – and it seems to fare well enough in that area. But there is a semantic and logical cost to this. See the ‘refuge’ of dual-factor theories as discussed by M&L.
And another thing – be careful with the restriction. Most people would like a general theory of concepts. Moreover, PT has troubles with natural kind concepts – see the problem of ignorance and error @ PT.
2. Some difficulties seem to be general. Consider the question: are prototypes constitutive of, or merely associated with concepts? It might be just a trivial fact about complexity that it’s easier to run the argument for BIRD.
3. I guess you’re thinking of the examples quoted by M&L @ p 35? But the point is general, as you can see even in the final part of that quote [grandmothers...dentists]. So no, it goes for general terms as well. The pet example here is… PET FISH. As general as you may like; in fact, concepts expressed by singular terms are secondary in the discussion.
Fodor’s main criticism is related to compositionality; that’s what matters. See e.g.
http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/tech_rpt/herring17.pdf
Let’s talk about your previous comment next time.
June 19, 2008 at 8:26 am
Somehow i missed the point. Probably lost in translation
Anyway … nice blog to visit.
cheers, Balance.