reading for next time: also online

Reminder: you need to read sections 1 & 2 [pp 3-27] of the first chapter in M&L. We copied the material, but since some of you were not in class it might be easier to read online.

The google book is here. Pages 3-27, ok?

summary of 1st class

We spent some time on introducing ourselves and on administrative matters – the structure of the course, evaluation etc. See Evaluation and Syllabus above; see also the previous posts on this blog.

We also tried to spell out what this course is about. Of course, since in this course we ask, among other things, what are concepts, we cannot start with a definition of concepts. So we implicitly started with words – since, intuitively at least, words stand for, or express, concepts.

What we tried was to grasp some of the problems raised by concepts by looking at some historical examples. In the Meno, Socrates says that we first need to know what is virtue before we can know if it can be taught. In Euthyphro we see the same pattern – what is piety is now the question.

This kind of question – ‘what is X?’ – seems to imply something like this: X is a kind of thing. There are many X-s around [e.g. many different virtuous acts], but, to the extent that they are Xs, they all have something in common. What they have in common can be captured by a definition. What the definition will specify is, in fact, our concept of X. Something is an X if and only if it satisfies the conditions given by the definition.

At the very roots of Western philosophy – of Western thought in fact - we find this effort to define fundamental concepts. Fundamental in different respects – for thought [what is knowledge? what is truth?], for society and social life [what is good? what is value? what is virtue?] or for art [what is beauty?].

This question came up quickly in the class: can we really define these fundamental concepts? If we leave that aside for a moment, we can ask: can we define any concept at all? It seems that we can, at least in logic or mathematics. But what about something as simple as ‘table’? Surely we know what tables are? But what is it that we know? Is it a definition?

The point is not that we can be seriously skeptical about tables and our knowledge thereof. The point is that in a simple move we question what tradition taught us about thought, about how the mind meets and understands the world.

More on definitions next time.

PS to first meeting

 First thing first: We will meet every Friday at 4 20 PM in room # 113!

Second: Thank you Diana, Ana, and Alex for coming today on such a short notice. There will be another post soon summarizing the little that we managed to talk about during the first class. We also remind you what we plan to do next [btw, see 'First class' below - that's pretty much the plan for next time].

 Read the part of introduction we gave you for next time. After that, you can make your own copies of the reader, which you will find in the library early next week [try Tuesday, just to be sure it's there].

George mentioned two examples from Plato this first time. Here’s where you find them:

 Plato - Euthyphro

Plato - Meno

For next time, in addition to the Intro, you can try [but we don't require you to]:

SEP entry on concepts [section 1]

SEP entry on Frege

… and if you’re brave enough:

Frege’s On Sense and Reference - the original in German is here

Third: do explore this website if you haven’t done that yet.

first meeting!

We meet tomorrow [Friday] at 4 PM outside the teachers room [cancelarie! ].  

Students that cannot take the course for credit but want to audit are welcome to talk to us about participating in the class.

update

The reader will only be available in the library the day of the first class. Sorry for the delay.

First class

We will probably have the first meeting on February 22nd – but make sure to check this site for updates. We will also let you know about the place. Below there’s a sketch of what we intend to do. Don’t worry if it sounds unfamiliar – the role of what follows is to give you some rough idea about the class, not to be a substitute for the class. Time allowing, we will do this for every class – a pre-class sketch or plan, and maybe some follow-up notes.

Every class will consist of two sessions, around 50 minutes each. For the first class, we will spend most of the first session discussing general issues: the topic, structure, and goals of the course, evaluation and grading, study materials etc. Our secret hope is to get over these things quickly and then spend some time on making sure we all have some pre-theoretic grasp of what concepts could be and why they matter. 

We will see that, psychologically, what we aim at belongs to a theory of mental representation. Philosophically, it belongs to semantics, or the theory of meaning. These things are important as they stand, but one special way of capturing their role is to point out that they are foundational ingredients in a mature theory of communication. We’ll have to navigate between points of view and disciplines often – and maybe shifting perspectives will make things clearer.

In the second session we will approach a particular conception of how language works – Frege’s distinction between sense [Ger. Sinn] and reference [Ger. Bedeutung] – and, against the author’s anti-psychologism, we will consider the question if his theory of language can be extended into a theory of concepts.

There are no readings assigned for the first class, since we want you to believe we’re nice. Being nice however doesn’t stop us from recommending a quick glance at the following materials (feel free to be superficial – just skip what you can’t follow):

> section 1 from the SEP entry on Concepts

> SEP entry on Frege

> Frege’s original paper [well, one of the En versions] ‘On Sense and Reference’

Once we’ll have the reader ready, there might be more. To be clear: none of this is mandatory, but redundancy, its reputation to the contrary, does not hurt. For the mandatory stuff, check the syllabus – we’ll also remind you here what’s next, since there might be minor changes as we proceed with the course.